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Government Entanglement With
Religion: What Degree Of Proof Is
Required?
LEE BOOTHBY*
Religious freedom is a fundamental right entitled to preferential treat-
ment. The Supreme Court, in recognizing this, has imposed a stiff test on
governmental action impinging on this right, the government must show a
compelling state interest and that the means used in implementing its poli-
cies are the least intrusive possible. However the court has not yet dis-
cussed the degree of proof required of the state in establishing these
factors. The author suggests that in light of the preferential position of reli-
gious freedom and its social impact, the standard of proof should be that
of clear and convincing evidence. While the general standard for civil liti-
gation is preponderance of the evidence, a more demanding standard is
called for when restriction on liberty interests are involved. Selection of a
standard of proof turns on the constitutional acceptability of an erroneous
decision. The author analogizes such similar interests as denaturalization,
civil commitments, deportation, discrimination, and free speech as lending
support to his proposition since they are currently protected by the higher
standard. He concludes that the same protection should be extended to
freedom of religion.
I. INTRODUCTION
The right to practice one's own religion without interference
* Undergraduate work, Andrews University; J.D., Wayne State University,
1957; General Counsel for Americans United for Separation of Church and State
Fund. Mr. Boothby has been involved in church-state conflict cases for ten years
and is a recognized authority on the free exercise clause of the first amendment.
has long been recognized as a cherished and fundamental right.
Indeed, the first sentence of our Bill of Rights prohibits Congress
from making any law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting its free exercise.'
It is basic that the free exercise of religion occupies a funda-
mental and preferred position.2 As Professor Kauper stated: "Of
all the constitutional guarantees, the protection of religious lib-
erty has been the most exalted."3 Chief Justice Burger, in refer-
ring to the preferential position of the first amendment, recently
stated that "[t]he values enshrined in the First Amendment
plainly rank high 'in the scales of our national values.' "4
In spite of the Court's repeated assertions revering the Free Ex-
ercise Clause of the first amendment, the individuals who laid
claim to these rights rarely prevailed against the government
prior to 1963.
In fact, the 1961 United States Supreme Court decision in
Braunfeld v. Brown held that where a state regulation infringed
on a "free exercise" right, the Court need only determine if the
purpose and effect of the state regulation in question is to ad-
vance the state's secular goals.5 In 1963, however, a major shift in
policy was evidenced by the Supreme Court's decision in Sherbert
v. Verner.6 The Court in Sherbert, while not specifically overrul-
ing its earlier decisions, nonetheless significantly affected the ap-
plication of those decisions by placing upon the state certain
specific burdens of proof in cases involving the free exercise of re-
ligion.
II. THE SHERBERT TEST
In Sherbert, Adell Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day Ad-
ventist Church, was fired from her job because her religious be-
liefs would not permit her to work on Saturday. Sherbert found it
impossible to locate other employment which did not demand
secular Saturday employment. She subsequently filed a claim for
unemployment compensation benefits. The state denied her
claim, determining that she was not entitled to benefits because
she had not made herself available for suitable work when offered
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d
995 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Sharp v. Segler, 408 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1969); State v. Yoder, 49
Wis. 2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539 (1971).
3. P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONsTrruTIoN 19 (1964).
4. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
5. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
6. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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by the state employment office.7
Justice Brennan, deviating significantly from the Court's earlier
ruling in Braunfeld, wrote that "[oI nly the gravest abuses, endan-
gering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limita-
tion."8
In Sherbert, the Court, in weighing the competing interests, es-
tablished the proper three-part test to be used in free exercise
cases:
1. Whether there was a burden imposed on the exercise of religion,9
2. Where such a burden was found, whether the infringement was justi-
fied by a compelling governmental interest, 10
3. And, where a compelling governmental interest had been shown to ex-
ist, whether there was any less intrusive alternate means available to
meet the state's objective. 1 1
The Court made clear that every governmental interest would not
overbalance a free exercise claim. The interest must be shown to
involve a grave and paramount state concern.12
The most important change in the Court's thinking in this area
was most certainly the placement of a burden on the state to es-
tablish: 1) that there was a compelling governmental interest in-
volving a paramount state interest and 2) the absence of any less
intrusive means whereby the state may carry out any such vital
state objective.
The "least intrusive alternative" aspect of the Sherbert test was
not a new first amendment concept. It had been previously enun-
ciated in Shelton v. Tucker,13 where the Court struck down a state
statute requiring teachers to file affidavits listing the organiza-
tions to which they belonged. In Shelton, the Court held that
even though the governmental purpose may have been legitimate
and substantial, that purpose could not be attained by a means
that infringed upon fundamental personal liberties if a less intru-
sive method of shifting means was available. The Court stated
that "[tjhe breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in
7. Id. at 401.
8. Id. at 406 (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
9. 374 U.S. at 403.
10. Id. at 406.
11. Id. at 407. Although the Sherbert test was first applied within the context
of a free exercise situation, it has also been applied to a variety of other first
amendment issues; see Women Strike for Peace v. Hickel, 420 F.2d 597, 605 (D.C.
Cir. 1969); Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Heilberg v. Fixa,
236 F. Supp. 405, 408 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
12. Id. at 405.
13. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic pur-
pose."14
One of the most significant post-Sherbert decisions is Wisconsin
v. Yoder.15 In this case, the Supreme Court, citing Sherbert, held
that there must be a state interest of sufficient magnitude to over-
ride an individual claim to protection under the Free Exercise
Clause: "The essence of all that has been said and written on the
subject is that only those interests of the highest order and those
not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free
exercise of religion."16
In Yoder, the Court upheld the right of Amish parents to re-
move teenage children from the public schools and held the provi-
sions of the state's compulsory education laws, as applied to
members of the Amish religion who had graduated from the
eighth grade, to be unconstitutional.
Even though the Yoder Court found that the state had a sub-
stantial interest in education generally, it sustained the holding of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court which ruled that "[a] compelling
interest is not just a general interest in the subject matter but the
need to apply the regulation without exception to attain the pur-
poses and objectives of the legislation."'7
The Sherbert test, as seen in Yoder, remains one of continuing
vitality,18 and its possible application in instances of governmen-
tal intrusion into church institutional affairs poses an interesting
question.
III. APPLICATION OF THE SHERBERT TEST TO GOVERNMENTAL
INTRUSION INTO CHURCH INSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS
There is currently a substantial fear among many church lead-
ers that state and federal governments are devising new and va-
ried means to determine the particular purposes of individual
churches and to define what is secular and what is religious.
Moreover, the fear exists among these church leaders that gov-
ernment is attempting to thrust itself into purely ecclesiastical
concerns.
A recent example of government activity which provokes such
fears involved an attempt by the National Labor Relations Board
to assert jurisdiction over Roman Catholic lay teachers.19 Other
14. Id. at 488.
15. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
16. Id. at 215.
17. State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 438, 182 N.W.2d 539, 542 (1972).
18. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTIrUTIONAL LAw, 851-65 (1978).
19. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
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examples include labor department directives requiring states to
include church operated schools within its unemployment com-
pensation program 20 and legislation applying restrictions and dis-
closure provisions to churches in their fund solicitation
programs. 21
In the recent case of Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets,22 the
Department of Consumer Affairs of Puerto Rico, in accordance
with its mandate to restrain inflationary trends, launched an in-
vestigation of the costs of private schools, including those oper-
ated by the Roman Catholic Church. The government subpoened
detailed financial records from the Catholic schools. The Inter-Di-
ocesan Secretariat for Catholic Education of Puerto Rico and
school superintendants refused to comply and brought suit. The
plaintiffs sought to have the Secretary permanently enjoined from
"interfering, meddling, or entangling with or in the financial af-
fairs of the Roman Catholic Church."23
Presiding Judge Coffin, writing the court's opinion in Surinach,
stated that the Commonwealth had "failed to shoulder its sub-
stantial burden of justifying" its encroachment into church af-
fairs.24 In Surinach, the court applied the Sherbert test to a case
where the claimed conflict with first amendment rights involved
the church as a corporate body, and not just the free exercise
claim of an individual. Significantly, it applied this test not only
to free exercise claims but also to claims of state entanglement.
The court stated:
Given our conclusion that the Secretary's demands for financial data of
these schools both burden the free exercise of religion and pose a threat
of entanglement between the affairs of the church and state, the Common-
wealth must show that 'some compelling state interest' justifies that bur-
den, and that there exists no less restrictive or entangling alternative.
This demanding level of scrutiny also is required here because of the vehi-
cle of regulation chosen by the Department-compelled disclosure which
implicates First Amendment rights.25
The decision in Surinach should have substantial impact in in-
stances where the state asserts authority to control the financial
affairs of a church and demands carte blanche to obtain financial
20. U.S. Dept. of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 39-78.
21. Valente v. Larsen, No. 4-78-453 (D. Minn. 1979); Heritage Village Church v.
North Carolina, 40 N.C.App. 429, 253 S.E.2d 473 (1979), affd, 48 U.S.L.W. 2640
(1980).
22. Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1979).
23. Id. at 75.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 79 (citations omitted).
records. The court warned that compelled disclosure has the po-
tential for substantially infringing upon the exercise of first
amendment rights. The court also stated that when there is com-
pelled disclosure, such state action can not be justified by a mere
showing of some legitimate governmental interest but that "the
subordinating interest of the State must survive exacting scru-
tiny."26
Thus, the Sherbert test has been applied to the individual
claims under the Free Exercise Clause and to church institutional
claims of government encroachment into church affairs.
IV. DEGREE OF PROOF REQUIRED IN CASES ARISING UNDER
RELIGION CLAUSES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
When the state infringes upon rights arising under the religious
clauses of the first amendment, a question arises regarding the
standard of proof constitutionally required for the state to prove
the existence of a compelling state interest and that the actions of
the state are the least intrusive alternative. While the Supreme
Court has held that the due process required by the fifth and
fourteenth amendments means that certain procedural protec-
tions must be granted to persons who may, in a non-criminal case,
suffer a loss of either liberty or property interest which is within
the ambit of the fifth or fourteenth amendment, the Court has
never specified the particular standard of proof constitutionally
required before the state can deprive an individual of such inter-
ests. It is submitted that the first and fourteenth amendments to
the United States Constitution require clear and convincing proof
from the government that a compelling state interest exists and
that the governmental action is the least intrusive alternative
available.
V. DUE PROCESS ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Several Supreme Court decisions 27 have provided an analytical
framework for ascertaining the procedural protections necessary
where the loss of a liberty or property interest is threatened. In
its analysis of whether any due process protection is required, the
Court has utilized a two-step process of reasoning. First, it must
initially be determined whether a protectable interest exists and
whether the individual will suffer a "grievous loss" to an interest
26. Id.
27. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). (Morrissey was explicit in its use
of this framework).
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"within the contemplation of the 'liberty or property' language of
the fourteenth amendment."28 If such an interest is involved, the
Court proceeds to the second stage of the analysis and considers
which procedural protections are required. This involves the de-
termination "of the precise nature of the government function in-
volved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by
governmental action." 29 The procedure chosen should reflect a
balance of these factors to insure that "fundamental fairness" is
achieved.
In determining whether procedural due process is required, the
Court in Board of Regents v. Roth30 stated that "we must look not
to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake. We must
look to see if the interest is within the Fourteenth Amendment's
protection of liberty and property."3 1 The first amendment's guar-
antees concerning religion are clearly within the protection pro-
vided by the fourteenth amendment, since the Due Process
Clause has been held to protect the rights to the free exercise of
religion 32 and the non-establishment of religion.33 Indeed, the
Court in Roth, quoting a lengthy list of freedoms enumerated in
Meyer v. Nebraska,34 specifically included an individual's freedom
"to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience"
as within the liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment.35
Because deprivation of one's first amendment rights triggers an
individual's entitlement to due process, it becomes necessary to
determine which specific procedures are required by the right.
The decision regarding the necessary standard of proof should re-
flect the nature of the liberty interest which is subject to depriva-
tion, as well as the interest of the state and others who may be
involved.
The Supreme Court recently discussed the function of a stan-
dard of proof in Addington v. Texas:
The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the
Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to instruct the fact
28. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972)).
29. 408 U.S. at 481.
30. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
31. 408 U.S. at 471 (citations omitted). In Roth the Supreme Court made clear
that it is improper to rely upon balancing to decide whether the right is applicable.
32. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
33. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
34. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1921).
35. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 572.
finder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should
have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adju-
dication. The standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the liti-
gants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate
decision. 36
In addressing the question of the applicable standard of proof
in a particular proceeding, Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opin-
ion in Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court,37 noted that the al-
location and degree of burden of proof is determined by the
nature of the rights implicated in the lawsuit. He quoted Speiser
v. Randall, in which first amendment rights were at issue:
There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in fact-
finding, which both parties must take into account. Where one party has
at stake an interest of transcending value-as a criminal defendant (sic]
his liberty-this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of
placing on the other party the burden of producing a sufficiency of proof
in the first instance, and of persuading in the factflnder at the conclusion
of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Due process com-
mands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has
borne the burden of producing the evidence and convincing the factflnder
of his guilt.38
VI. THE "CLEAR AND CONVINCING PROOF" STANDARD
In general, the required standard of proof in civil litigation is a
mere preponderance of the evidence. Since civil cases typically
involve disputes between private parties, the preponderance stan-
dard is appropriate because "society has a minimal concern with
the outcome of such private suits, ... "39
Yet for certain issues courts have required a higher degree of
proof than a preponderance of the evidence--clear and convincing
proof. This is a standard used in unusual civil cases where, for
exceptional reasons-such as the difficulty of proof of an issue or
a reason to be distrustful of a particular party-a higher standard
than normally imposed is required.4 0
VII. "CLEAR AND CONVINCING PROOF" AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES
In addition to the above situations, this more demanding stan-
36. 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (citations omitted).
37. 407 U.S. 355 (1972).
38. Id. at 362. (Douglas, J., dissenting), quoting from Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
39. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 423.
40. "Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which
will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the
allegations sought to be established. It is intermediate, being more than a mere
preponderance, but not to the extent of such certainty as is required beyond a rea-
sonable doubt as in criminal cases." Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477, 120
N.E.2d 118, 123 (1954), footnoted in Hobson v. Eaton, 339 F.2d 781, 784 (6th Cir.
1968).
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dard has also been imposed in situations where the various inter-
ests of society are pitted against restrictions on the liberty of the
individual. The Supreme Court has used this standard of proof
"to protect particularly important individual interests in various
civil cases." 41
A. Denaturalization, Expatriation, and Deportation
The Supreme Court has held that in denaturalization, expatria-
tion, and deportation hearings in the area of citizenship and im-
migration, the government must prove its allegations by clear,
unequivocal, and convincing evidence.4 2 In the first of these deci-
sions, involving denaturalization, the Court explained its reason-
ing, stating that "rights once conferred should not be lightly
revoked. And more especially is this true when the rights are pre-
cious and when they are conferred by solemn adjudication, as is
the situation where citizenship is granted."43
In a later decision involving the deportation of aliens, the Court
rejected the contention that because such proceedings are civil,
"a person may be banished from this country upon no higher de-
gree of proof than applies to a negligence case." 44 In light of the
"drastic deprivations" that may follow a deportation, the Court
held the higher standard of clear, unequivocal, and convincing
proof to be necessary.45
B. Civil Commitment
In a recent opinion, the Supreme Court has held that a clear
and convincing standard of proof is required by the fourteenth
amendment in a civil proceeding brought under state law to invol-
untarily commit an individual to a state mental hospital for an in-
definite period.46 Such a standard was required because the
individual's liberty interest in the outcome of a civil commitment
proceeding is of greater weight and gravity than the state's inter-
est in providing care to its citizens with emotional disorders and
41. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 453.
42. Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (ex-
patriation); Schneidermann v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943) (denaturaliza-
tion).
43. Schneidermann v. United States, 320 U.S. at 125.
44. Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966).
45. Id.
46. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 423.
in protecting the community from potentially dangerous mentally
ill persons. The Court noted that the "individual should not be
asked to share equally with society the risk of error when the pos-
sible injury to the individual is significantly greater than any pos-
sible harm to the state."47 It recognized that in cases involving
individual rights, the standard of proof reflects the value society
places on individual liberty, regardless of whether a case is crimi-
nal or civil.48
C. Equal Protection and Racial Discrimination
The principle is well-established that where a history of racial
discrimination is shown to exist, the burden of showing nondis-
crimination in particular situations shifts to the party having the
power to produce the facts. 49 In two critical areas, public educa-
tion and private employment, courts have held that this burden of
showing nondiscrimination can only be met by the presentation
of "clear and convincing evidence."
For example, when a plaintiff alleges that conduct of a school
system is racially-motivated, a prima facie case of violation of
substantive constitutional rights under the equal protection
clause is shown if the system has a history of racial discrimina-
tion. The burden then shifts to the school authorities, who must
rebut the prima facie case by showing by clear and convincing ev-
idence that permissible, racially neutral criteria governed their
conduct.50
Likewise, numerous cases which have dealt with the issue of ra-
cial discrimination in private employment have established that a
prima facie showing of past discrimination shifts the burden to
the employer to prove that a particular person or class of persons
would have been denied the contested job, promotion, transfer,
etc., absent racial discrimination. "And those courts which have
given the most careful consideration to the burden of proof ques-
47. Id. at 427.
48. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has re-
quired the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in such cases. See In re Ballay,
482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
49. See Rolfe v. County Board of Education of Lincoln County, Tennessee, 391
F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968); Chambers v. Hendersonville Bd. of Educ., 364 F.2d 189 (4th
Cir. 1966).
50. See generally Keyes v. Denver School Dist., 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Reynolds v.
Abbeville County School Dist., 554 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Jones County
School Dist., 544 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1977); Jones v. Pitt County Bd. of Educ., 528 F.2d
414 (4th Cir. 1975); Alexander v. Warren School Dist., 464 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1972);
Wall v. Stanley County Bd. of Educ., 378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1967); Chambers v. Hen-
dersonville City Bd. of Educ., 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966); Baker v. Columbus Mu-
nicipal Separate School Dist., 329 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Williams v.
Kimbrough, 295 F. Supp. (W.D. La. 1969).
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tion have held that the employee must prevail unless the em-
ployer proves its case by clear and convincing evidence."5'
D. First Amendment Rights
The clear and convincing standard is not foreign to cases con-
cerned with first amendment liberties. In Rosenbloom v. Me-
tromedia,52 a plurality of the Supreme Court held that proof of
libel required clear and convincing evidence due to the important
first amendment issues involved. It found that an erroneous ver-
dict for the plaintiff in a libel case was most serious because the
possibility of such an error "would create a strong impetus toward
self-censorship which the First Amendment cannot tolerate." 53
The Court concluded that the safeguarding of important first
amendment rights necessitated a more rigorous standard of proof:
We thus hold that a libel action by a private individual against a licensed
radio station for a defamatory falsehood in a newscast relating to his in-
volvement in an event of public or general concern may be sustained only
upon clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was pub-
lished with knowledge that it was false with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not.5 4
This holding in Rosenbloom was consistent with the earlier
Supreme Court case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.55 In the
New York Times case, the Court, concerned with the defamation
of a public figure, found that the proof presented to show actual
malice lacked "the convincing clarity which the constitutional
standard demands."5 6
In his concurring opinion in a decision which found an Alabama
law on obscenity to be facially unconstitutional in both civil and
criminal aspects, Justice Brennan argues that the hazards to first
amendment freedoms inherent in the regulation of obscenity ne-
cessitate that the state comply with the most demanding standard
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a civil proceeding. "Inher-
51. Day v. Matthews, 530 F. 2d 1083, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also Seven-Up
Bottling Co. v. Seven-Up Co., 561 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1977); Stewart v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 542 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. United States Steel Corp.,
520 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211
(5th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir.
1974); Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., 495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974); Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972).
52. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
53. Id. at 40.
54. Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
55. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
56. Id. at 285.
ent in all factfinding procedures is the potential for erroneous
judgments and, when First Amendment values are implicated, the
selection of the standard of proof of necessity implicates the rela-
tive constitutional acceptability of erroneous judgments."57 Jus-
tice Brennan found that inherent in the increased likelihood of
error resulting from a preponderance of the evidence standard
are the dangers of "the likelihood of self-censorship and the erro-
neous proscription of constitutionally protected material."5 8 Such
dangers are just as likely in civil as in criminal regulation, and the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is thus necessary to re-
duce the hazards to first amendment freedoms to a tolerable
level. 59
It can be readily seen that clear and convincing proof is the
standard required to sustain claims which have serious conse-
quences or harsh or far-reaching effects. 60 In institutional free ex-
ercise of religion cases, when the Court is dealing with the
weighing of evidence submitted by the government to sustain its
burdens of proof under the Sherbert test, no quantum of proof is
appropriate other than the clear and convincing standard. This is
because the Court is dealing with a claim which holds a preferred
position and has far-reaching social consequences. It is the only
standard that fits the requirements of close scrutiny mandated by
the religion clauses of the first amendment.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In a case involving either government infringement of free exer-
cise rights or state intrusion into church institutional concerns, a
heavy burden of proof falls upon the government to establish the
existence of a compelling state interest and the absence of any
less violative method of attaining the government's objectives.
It is clear that the government cannot meet the burden imposed
upon it by Sherbert by simply asserting the existence of some
generally recognized interest which the state has over the subject
matter. As Professor Tribe has stated:
In applying the least intrusive alternative-compelling interest require-
ment, it is crucial to avoid the error of equating the state's interest in de-
nying an exemption with the state's usually much greater interest in
maintaining the underlying rule or program for unexceptional cases. Only
the first interest-that in denying an exemption-is constitutionally rele-
vant when an exemption is sought.6 1
The courts have not yet discussed the degree of proof which is
57. McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 684 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 687.
59. Id.
60. United States v. Bridges, 133 F. Supp. 638, 641 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
61. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTINrrIONAL LAw 855 (1978).
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required in applying the Sherbert test. It is submitted, however,
that only the clear and convincing standard is suitable for permit-
ting the infringement or intrusion by the state into religious mat-
ters protected by the religion clauses of the first amendment.
This degree of proof should be unequivocally required of the
government whenever it seeks to thrust the power of the state
into this sensitive and delicate area of constitutional concern.
Government should not be permitted to enter this sacred domain
without the same type of showing required when other precious
rights are at stake.
The application of the Sherbert test, coupled with a high stan-
dard of proof, is the best protection against a government that,
from time to time, may lose sight of the fact that its most compel-
ling governmental concern should be to insure the protection of
those rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.

